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THE END OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYER-OPERATED PENSION
PLANS: THE CHALLENGE OF
THE MANHART CASE*
The underlying principle of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964' is that employers generally must make employment decisions on
the basis of the individual characteristics of an applicant or employee.2
Employers are prohibited under Title VII from making employment
decisions on the basis of an individual's sex.3 In contrast, insurers rely
on certain group characteristics, as reflected by statistically valid actua-
rial tables, and consequently assume that every individual in the partic-
ular group will live as long as the average member of the group. The
application of such groupings permits insurers to comply with the un-
derlying principle of annuities: "that the fund from which annuitants
are paid should not be exhausted until the last annuitant covered by the
fund dies."4 By relying on group characteristics, insurers are able to
predict the life expectancies of their annuitants with the accuracy re-
quired to comply with the principle of sufficient funding.5
Traditionally, insurers have grouped insureds for these purposes
* The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Dean Theodore J. St. An-
toine, University of Michigan Law School, in the preparation of this Note.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Gold, Equality of Opportunity in Retirement Funds, 9 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 596 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Gold];
Halperin & Gross, Sex Discrimination and Pensions: Are We Moving Toward Unisex Tables?,
30 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 235 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Halperin & Gross].
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
2. For a more complete discussion of the principles of Title VII, see text accompanying
notes 10-28 infra.
3. The statutes provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's. . . sex. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's... sex ....
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
4. EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631,634 (D. Me. 1977), ree'don othergrounds, 589
F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978).
5. See notes 29-38 infra and accompanying text.
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on the basis of age and sex. In regard to sex, the actuarial tables show
that the average woman lives longer than the average man. Insurers
therefore have forced women either to make larger contributions to the
annuity fund or to receive smaller periodic benefits out of the fund than
their male counterparts, thereby permitting benefits to be paid to wo-
men over their longer average life expectancy without exhausting the
annuity fund. Of course, the generalization that women as a group
live longer than men as a group does not always hold true on an indi-
vidual basis.7 Thus, there is a tension between the principles of Title
VII and the traditional application of the principles of annuities. Title
VII forbids employers from classifying or discriminating against indi-
viduals on the basis of sex, while annuities have traditionally required
an employer to classify employees by sex and treat female employees
differently in pension contributions or benefits because of their sex in
order to provide an actuarially sound plan.
For fourteen years after the enactment of Title VII, this tension
was resolved outside of the courts in favor of traditional annuity princi-
ples. In April 1978, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided City ofLos Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,8
which held that Title VII's focus on the individual must prevail over
any insurance principle of grouping by sex. An employer-operated
pension plan may no longer legally require greater contributions from
female employees than male employees on the assumption that the fe-
males will live longer than their male counterparts.9
This Note will discuss the tension between Title VII and applied
insurance principles and the Manhart resolution of this tension. In ad-
dition, the financial problems that face an employer attempting to oper-
ate a nondiscriminatory pension plan will be examined. The Note will
conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Manhart is a challenge
to the actuarial community to devise new standards by which pension
plans can be operated on both financially sound and nondiscriminatory
bases.
6. See notes 34-35 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, eg., Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 n.5 (D. Ore. 1975), in which the
court found that only 16% of women outlive their male counterparts.
8. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court. He was joined by
Justices Powell, Stewart and White. Justice Blackmun concurred in a separate opinion. Justice
Marshall concurred and dissented (on the issue of retroactivity) in a separate opinion. Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan did
not participate in the Court's decision.
9. Id.
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I. THE TENSION BETWEEN TITLE VII AND ANNUITY PRINCIPLES
A. Title VII.
The main purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19640 is
"to eliminate ... discrimination in employment."" The most overt
type of discrimination that Title VII eliminates is a wage differential
between men and women performing equal work. However, under cer-
tain circumstances, Title VII will permit an employer to differentiate
between his male and female employees with regard to wages or com-
pensation. The Bennett Amendment to Title VII allows such differenti-
ation if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act.' 2 The Equal Pay Act, in
turn, permits a wage differential between members of the opposite sex
"where such payment is made pursuant to ... (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex .... ,,13 Enforcement of the provi-
sions of Title VII is thus left to two administrative agencies: the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for en-
suring compliance with Title VII and the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of Labor performs a similar role under the Equal Pay
Act.1
4
One threshold question concerning the reach of Title VII is
whether the statute's coverage extends to employer-operated pension
and annuity plans. When Congress mandated nondiscrimination by
employers on the basis of sex with regard to "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment... $15 did it intend to reach
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
11. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2391, 2401.
12. The Bennett Amendment provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for an employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensa-
tion paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the provisions of 206(d) of Title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The Equal Pay Act was enacted the year before Title VII.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). Other circumstances excepted by the Equal Pay Act are
"where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production .. d.." M. For an example of a
"factor other than sex" that permitted a compensation differential, see General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Gilbert case involved an industrial disability plan that did not
cover the costs of normal pregnancy. The Supreme Court held that pregnancy was a physical
condition that constituted a "factor other than sex" for the purposes of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act, thereby making its noninclusion in the disability plan nondiscriminatory. The Gilbert
case will be discussed in greater detail in text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
14. Under current guidelines, the EEOC gives "appropriate consideration" to the interpreta-
tions of the Equal Pay Act, but the Commission is not bound by such interpretations. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.8(b), (c) (1978). The interplay between the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division will be
examined more fully in the text accompanying notes 56-76 infra.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
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pension plans? Several United States district courts and circuit courts
of appeals have answered this question in the affimative.'6 In the
cases, at least four propositions are raised in favor of including pension
and retirement plans under Title VII. First, Congress foresaw the
scope of Title VII as a broad protective shield." In light of this, one
court has determined that it would be wholly inconsistent to exclude
pensions from its coverage.1 8 Second, courts have relied on the admin-
istrative interpretations of the EEOC. 9 These administrative interpre-
tations explicitly include pension plans under Title VII2 Third, courts
have reasoned that Title VII must include retirement benefits because
the language of Title VII2' is similar to that employed in the National
Labor Relations Act, 2 which has been held to include retirement bene-
fits as conditions of employment.2 3 Fourth, courts have held that the
legislative history of Title VII does not show a "strong indication of
legislative intent"24 that pension plans were to be specifically excluded
16. See, e.g., Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490,492 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1973); Bart-
mess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1187-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 286-88 (D. Conn. 1974), aI'd, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
17. During the debates on Title VII, an amendment was offered that would have limited the
scope of the Act to explicit discrimination based solely on sex. "Congress specifically rejected
[this] amendment to the Act which would have so limited the force of the prohibition against sex
discrimination. Such a limitation, it was felt, would emasculate the Act. See 110 CONG. REc.
2728, 13,825 [1964]." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 n.4 (7th Cir. 1971).
18. "In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
19. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1973); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 286-88 (D. Conn. 1974), af'd, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'don other
grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). These administrative interpretations are entitled to great deference
in the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
20. Until 1972, the guideline relied on by the courts provided that: "A difference in optional
or compulsory retirement ages based on sex violates Title VII.' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 1(a) (1971). In
1972, the EEOC promulgated new guidelines that made the inclusion of pension plans under Title
VII more explicit: "(a) 'Fringe Benefits,' as used herein, includes ... retirement benefits ....
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and
women with regard to fringe benefits." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a), (b) (1978).
21. "Compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment ..... 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
22. "Rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
23. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
Under Title VII, one court has held: "We entertain no doubt that Congress intended Title VII to
reach retirement plans as conditions of employment, just as such retirement plans are viewed as
employment conditions under the National Labor Relations Act." Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R.,
483 F.2d 490, 492 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).




from the broad coverage of Title VII, and therefore, the words of the
statute25 must be read "with their commonly accepted meanings. ' 26
Thus, the lower federal courts have repeatedly and consistently held
that Title VII is broad enough in coverage to reach pension and retire-
ment plans. The Supreme Court has never focused on whether Title
VII covers pension plans, but it has given cursory treatment to the
question of whether the Equal Pay Act permits pension plans to differ-
entiate by sex.2 7
In examining Title VII, the reader cannot mistake the statute's em-
phasis on the individual: it is unlawful under Title VII "to discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . sex
... 2 The unmistakable mandate of Title VII is that in employ-
ment situations, men and women must be treated as individuals and
not treated differently merely because of their gender. Since Title VII
demands individualized treatment of employees and since Title VII in-
cludes pension plans, it follows that employers must not differentiate
among employees because of their sex in the operation of a pension
plan. As a practical matter, however, employees traditionally have
been treated differently under employer-operated pension plans be-
cause of their sex.
B. The Princoles and Operations of Annuities. 29
1. The Fundamental Prncle of Insurance. A fundamental prin-
ciple of insurance is the spreading of risk. This risk-spreading is
achieved by grouping together insureds of similar risks. However,
grouping by risk does not mean that insureds of the same risk group
will have similar loss experiences. Some members of the group will be
better risks than the group average while some will be poorer risks. By
attributing the average risk to each member of the group, the insurer
makes the better risks subsidize the poorer risks and spreads the total
risk over the group.30
25. See note 21 supra.
26. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 404 U.S.
939 (1971). See note 77 infra and text accompanying notes 77-82 infra. At least one commentator
has suggested a different way of resolving the legislative history dispute in favor of inclusion. The
argument is that when Title VII was amended in 1972, Congress could have specifically excluded
pension plans, but it did not, thereby vindicating the opinions of the courts. Gold 602. Professor
Gold also argues that a fifth reason for inclusion, in addition to the four raised by the courts, is the
public policy of protection of pension rights. Id. at 603-04.
27. See text accompanying notes 77-82 infra.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
29. In this section, only traditional principles and operations of pensions (Ze., pre-Manharl)
are discussed.
30. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978).
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2. Diferentiation By Sex. Traditionally, insurers have grouped
people on the basis of age3 and sex. As noted earlier, the basic as-
sumption underlying the differentiation between men and women in
pension plans-that women live longer than men-is not always valid
for individual pensioners. 32 The life expectancy tables relied on by an-
nuity fund operators reflect only the experience of men and women as
groups. As a group, women will live longer than men, and it is group
experience that insurers, including annuity funds, rely on in determin-
ing the cost of a risk. The pension operator cannot predict when any
given individual will die; thus, it is impossible for the operator to calcu-
late the cost of paying such individual a specified amount per month
for life, and the operator must rely on actuarial groupings:
It is, of course, true that actuarial tables of some sort should be used,
for longevity cannot be determined for any particular individual.
This reliance means that statistically average characteristics will be
attributed to individual members of a described class; even if such
tables accurately generalize about a group whose members are in
some way similarly situated, they are necessarily inaccurate as to
particular members.33
The insurance justification for this differentiation between the
sexes is the fact that the life expectancy of women is greater than that of
men at all ages,34 which means that periodic benefits must be paid to
women for a longer time span than to men. On this basis, annuities
either charge women more than men for an annuity or give women
smaller periodic benefits than men in order that the fund will not be
depleted until the last annuitant of the fund has died."
Insurance deals with transference of risk. Since no individual can ever know with cer-
tainty the risk he represents, he joins a larger group and, through the operation of the
laws of probability and large numbers, protects himself from his uncertainty. This trans-
ference is at the core of insurance principles.
Note, Sex Discrimination andSex-BasedMortaliy Tables, 53 B.U.L. REV. 624,653-54 (1973). See
generally J. MAGEE & D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 3-50 (7th ed. 1964); R. MEHR & E.
CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 3-47 (5th ed. 1972).
31. Grouping by age is discussed in note 104 infra.
32. There is evidence that the overlap of death ages of men and women is as high as 84%.
Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 n.5 (D. Ore. 1975); King, Men, Women, andLife
.4nnuities, 43 J. RISK & INs. 553, 556-57 (1976) (quoting Professor Barbara Bergmann of Commit-
tee W of the American Association of University Professors).
33. Bernstein & Williams, Title VlI and the Problem of Sex Classfcations in Pension Pro-
grams, 74 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1203, 1208 (1974).
34. Current life expectancy tables show that the life expectancy of a 65 year-old male is 17
years while that of his female counterpart is 21 years. Edwards, .4 BeneFt Manager s Guide to Sex,
42 J. RISK & INS. 189, 193 (1975).
35. This, of course, is the cardinal principle of annuities. See text accompanying note 4
supra. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1976),
requires that pension plans be actuarially sound but is of no help in determining what is an actua-
rially sound treatment of sex.
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The principal business reason for pension operators to differentiate
on the basis of sex is that men comprise a larger share of the annuity
market than women, and sex-segregated actuarial tables keep premi-
ums lower for men than if the two sexes were grouped together. 6
Thus, pension operators classify by sex to remain competitive in a
predominantly male market. Other business justifications for classifica-
tion by sex include the following: (1) the classification is easy to deter-
mine and apply;37 (2) it yields statistically valid predictions; and (3) it
yields relatively broad groupings that in turn allow for the spreading of
risk, which is at the heart of insurance philosophy.8
3. Types ofPension Plans. A pension plan may be of two types: a
defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan.3 1 In a defined ben-
efit plan, the plan operator agrees to pay its annuitants a set amount
each period, usually monthly, and then sets contributions at a level to
meet the predetermined benefit obligations. In a defined contribution
plan, the reverse is true. The contributions to the pension plan are pre-
determined. Benefits, rather than being stated, are a function of the
amount of contributions and investment performance. 40 The distinc-
tion between the two types of plans is that under a defined contribution
plan men and women make equal contributions, but men receive larger
periodic benefits; while under a defined benefit plan, women make
higher contributions than men, but periodic benefits are the same for
both sexes.4' Regardless of which type of plan is used, the cost is
greater for women, either because they pay more into the fund than
men in order to receive periodic benefits equal to those of the men or
because they are receiving a smaller periodic benefit than men after
36. Gold 623 n.ll0.
37. A person's sex is easily determinable, unlike other possible classifications, such as the
ages at which one's parents died. Sexual classification is also easy to apply because sex is normally
immutable, unlike the traits of smoking, drinking and obesity.
38. See generally Gold; Halperin & Gross 245-50; Note, supra note 30, at 625-28.
39. A defined benefit plan is also known as a formula benefit plan. Similarly, a defined
contribution plan can be called a money purchase plan.
40. See generally Edwards, supra note 34, at 193; Halperin & Gross 236-38. Of course, the
contribution rate is frequently determined by some set of benefits goal, making it difficult to dis-
tinguish the two types of plans.
41. Halperin & Gross 238. To illustrate, assume a 65 year-old man and a 65 year-old woman
both began paying into an annuity plan at age 60 and both will live to age 70. Under a defined
contribution plan, both will have paid into the fund $100 per month, but the man will receive
benefits of $100 per month while the woman will receive $85. Under a defined benefit plan, the
man will have paid into the fund $100 per month while the woman will have made corresponding
payments of $115 per month; both the man and the woman will receive benefits of $100 per
month. These figures are hypothetical, and an actual fund operator will determine his figures by
use of sex segregated actuarial tables.
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having made contributions equal to those made by men.
The fundamental principles of insurance are grouping of risks and
spreading of risks. The basic concern of Title VII is that employers not
discriminate against employees because of an individual employee's
sex. Because pension operators have traditionally differentiated be-
tween men and women, there has been a conflict between the applica-
tion of the insurance principle of grouping and the Title VII principle
of fairness to individuals. This conflict was presented for resolution to
the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart.4 2
II. THE Manhart CASE
A. Facts and Holding.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power operated a re-
tirement, disability and death benefits program for its employees. The
retirement benefits part of the program was administered as a defined
benefit plan with men and women of the same age, seniority and salary
receiving equal periodic benefits.43 These benefits were funded by em-
ployee and employer contributions' and the investment earnings on
such contributions. In administering the defined benefit plan, the De-
partment followed standard insurance procedure and utilized separate
life expectancy tables for its male and female employees to determine
the level of contributions. To account for the greater life expectancy of
females as a group and the resulting higher cost of pensions for the
female employee group, contributions by female employees were al-
most fifteen percent higher than for similarly situated male employ-
ees.45 Because employee contributions were deducted from pay checks,
female employees earning the same base salary as male employees took
home less pay than their male counterparts.
A group of past and present female employees brought a class ac-
tion suit against the Department on behalf of women whom it em-
ployed or formerly employed. The complaint alleged that by requiring
higher contributions from female employees than from male employees
the Department was discriminating on the basis of sex against each fe-
male employee with respect to her "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" 46 in violation of Title VII. The female em-
42. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
43. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
44. Employer contributions equaled 110% of employee contributions. 435 U.S. at 705 n.4.
45. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). See note 3 supra.
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ployees sought an injunction against the differential in contributions
and restitution of past excess contributions.47
The Manhart case thus squarely presented the Supreme Court
with a clash between the principles of Title VII and the traditional op-
erations of the insurance industry. The Supreme Court resolved this
clash of competing principles in favor of Title VII, holding that the
Department could not assess female employees at a higher contribution
rate than its male employees: 48
[Title VII's] focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes
treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual, or national class. If height is required for a job, a tall woman
may not be refused employment merely because, on the average,
women are too short. Even a true generalization about a class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the gen-
47. Although the Department's retirement benefits program had been in operation for several
years, it only became subject to Title ViI on March 24, 1972, the effective date of amendments to
Title VII. The amendments redefined "employer" to include state and local governments. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). The amendments were made in Pub. L. No. 92-261, 88 Stat. 103 (1972).
The California legislature, after the initial complaint in Manhart had been filed, enacted a law
requiring governmental units to equalize pension contributions as of January 1, 1975. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1978). The Department complied with this law by lowering female
contributions to the level of male contributions and by increasing its contributions on behalf of its
female employees. Telephone interview with David J. Oliphant, Deputy City Attorney, City of
Los Angeles, California (Oct. 10, 1978) (Mr. Oliphant represented the Department before the
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court). Consequently, by the time the Manhart case
came before the Supreme Court, only the pension contributions for the years 1972-1975 were
contested by the parties. The injunction sought by the female employees was thus mooted, but the
question of a substantial violation of Title VII during 1972-1975 was properly before the Court on
the issue of the propriety of retroactive relief.
The district court in Manhart held that the contribution differential violated Title VII and
ordered all excess contributions refunded. 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 553 F.2d 581 (1976).
48. However, the Supreme Court did not grant the female employees' request for restitution
of the excess contributions made between March 24, 1972 and December 31, 1975. While the
Court acknowledged the doctrine of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), which
creates a presumption in favor of retroactive relief, it nevertheless held that the presumption was
overcome in this case for the following reasons: (1) "Pension administrators could reasonably have
thought it unfair-or even illegal--to make male employees shoulder more than than their 'actua-
rial share' of the pension burden," 435 U.S. at 720; (2) "[t]here is no reason to believe that the
threat of a backpay award is needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices to
conform to this decision," Id. at 720-21; and (3) there were potential adverse effects that retroac-
tive relief could have on the liquidity of pension funds (which amounted to over $400 billion at
the end of 1977) and on the general economy, id. at 721-23. Justice Marshall, who concurred in
the rest of the Court's judgment, dissented on the issue of retroactive relief. Concerning the first
point raised by the Court, Marshall pointed out that the EEOC guidelines, see notes 56-64 infra
and accompanying text, have prohibited unequal contributions since 1972 and that the Depart-
ment should have been put on notice by the guidelines that it was in violation of Title VII. Mar-
shall ignored the Court's second argument. Regarding the third point, the dissent noted that it
was not shown that the amount of backpay involved in this case would have a devastating effect
on the plan. Id. at 728-33.
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eralization does not apply.
That proposition is of critical importance in this case because
there is no assurance that any individual woman working for the De-
partment will actually fit the generalization on which the Depart-
ment's policy is based. Many of those individuals will not live as
long as the average man. While they were working, those individuals
received small paychecks because of their sex, but they will receive
no compensating advantage when they retire.
It is true, of course, that while contributions are being collected
from the employees, the Department cannot know which individuals
will predecease the average woman. Therefore, unless women as a
class are assessed an extra charge, they will be subsidized, to some
extent, by the class of male employees.49
Although one commentator has said that "[t]he outcome of the
case should not have been startling to anyone. . . except for the sheer
ubiquitousness of actuarial habits persisting after enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,''5° the defendants in Manhart sought to de-
fend the higher contributions assessed to the female employees with
four arguments. First, the Department argued that the guidelines of
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor took prece-
dence over the guidelines of the EEOC, and that the Wage and Hour
Division guidelines authorized a differential in contributions.5 ' Sec-
ond, the Department contended that the legislative histories of Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act made it clear that pension plans and other
employee benefit plans were excluded from the coverage of Title VII. 2
Third, the Department argued that the differentiation was based on
longevity, not on sex, thereby bringing the alleged discrimination
within the "factor other than sex" exclusion to Title VII of the Bennett
Amendment. 3 The fourth defense raised by the Department was that
equal contribution levels for male and female employees would be un-
fair to the group of male employees that would be forced to subsidize
the group of female employees. In other words, the higher contribu-
tions for females did not constitute discrimination because the higher
amounts were offset by the higher value of pension benefits provided to
49. 435 U.S. at 708-09.
50. Van Alstyne, Equalityfor Individuals or Equaltyfor Groups: Implications ofthe Supreme
Court Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 Am. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 150, 151 (1978).
51. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 10-23, 46-49, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). For the provisions and an analysis of the various guide-
lines, see notes 56-76 infra and accompanying text. All subsequent citations to the briefs of the
respective parties are to the briefs ified in the Manhart case in the Supreme Court unless otherwise
indicated.
52. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 10-23, 46-49.
53. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 46-49; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14-16.
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the female employees due to that group's greater average longevity.54
In making its first three arguments, the Department relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,55 in which
the Court upheld the exclusion from an employer disability plan of the
costs resulting from pregnancy and childbirth. The next section of this
Note examines the defenses raised by the Department and demon-
strates that the Supreme Court properly rejected them.
B. Analysis of the Manhart Opinion.
1. Guidelines of the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division. The
principal government agency responsible for the enforcement of Title
VII is the EEOC. 6 In Title VII actions, the defendant is allowed to
raise as a defense the fact that the alleged discriminatory employment
practice is authorized by the provisions of the Equal Pay Act.57 The
principal enforcement agency under the Equal Pay Act is the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor.5 8 Thus, in any action in-
volving Title VII, attention must be given to the interplay of the guide-
lines promulgated by the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division.59
54. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16-23.
55. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 5, 6, 8, 9 (1976).
57. See notes 12-13 supra.
58. See note 14 supra.
59. It is important to note that the "guidelines" issued by these agencies are not "regula-
tions." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). A regulation promulgated
under statutory authority must be given the same effect as a pronouncement of Congress. A
guideline, however, is accorded a different treatment by the courts:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con-
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); accord, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971).
In addition to the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division, two other federal agencies have
authority to issue guidelines concerning sex discrimination in employment. The Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has responsibility under Exec. Order No. 11,246, as
amendedb, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 406 (1969), to police sex discrimination by federal
contractors. Under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86
Stat. 373, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is given the task of ensuring that
educational institutions receiving federal funds do not discriminate against their employees be-
cause of the employees' sex. Prior to Manhart, the guidelines of the OFCCP, 41 C.F.R. § 60-
20.3(c) (1977) and the guidelines of HEW, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,237 (1974) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R.
§ 86.46(b)(2)), followed the Wage and Hour Division, thus making them secondary for the pur-
poses of this discussion. But f the proposed amendments to the guidelines of the OFCCP at 43
Fed. Reg. 38,057 (1978) (the OFCCP withdrew its support of the old Wage and Hour Division
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Prior to 1972, the EEOC bound itself to the guidelines of the Wage
and Hour Division under the Equal Pay Act.60 The Wage and Hour
Division approved of traditional insurance practices under both de-
fined contribution and defined benefit plans. The Division's guidelines
permitted an employer to comply with the Equal Pay Act, and thus
Title VII, either by making equal contributions for employees of both
sexes or by providing equal benefits to both sexes.6' The Wage and
Hour Division guidelines formulated no rule regarding a differential in
the amount of employee contributions.62 In 1972, however, the EEOC
promulgated new guidelines. In these guidelines, the EEOC said that it
would no longer consider as binding in Title VII actions the interpreta-
tions of the Equal Pay Act by the Wage and Hour Division.63 The
Commission then announced its own rule on pension and retirement
benefit plans: benefts to members of each sex must be equal without
regard to whether contributions are equal, and it is no defense to a
charge of sex discrimination under Title VII that it costs the employer
more to provide the same benefits to members of one sex than to the
guideline in favor of the post-Manhart proposed Wage and Hour Division guideline. See text
accompanying note 74 infra).
60. The interpretative bulletin of the EEOC provided as follows:
(a) Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act
(section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) in order to
avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situations to which both
statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703(h) [The Ben-
nett Amendment] to mean that the standards of 'equal pay for equal work' set forth in
the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are
applicable to Title VII. ....
(b) Accordingly, the Commission will make applicable to equal pay complaints
filed under Title VII the relevant interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour
Division, Department of Labor .... Relevant opinions of the Administrator interpret-
ing 'the equal pay for equal work standard' will also be adopted by the Commission.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a), (b) (1968).
61. The guideline provides:
Contributions to employee benoftplans. If employer contributions to a plan provid-
ing insurance or similar benefits to employees are equal for both men and women, no
wage differential prohibited by the equal pay provisions will result from such payments,
even though the benefits which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one
sex than for the other. The mere fact that the employer may make unequal contributions
for employees of opposite sexes in such a situation will not, however, be considered to
indicate that the employer's payments are in violation of section 6(d), if the resulting
benefits are equal for such employees.
29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1978). This guideline is often referred to as the "either-or" rule.
62. The Department of Labor stressed this very point in an amicus brief in the Manhart case
in the Ninth Circuit. Amicus Brief for Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor at
4, 6, Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. The guideline provides:
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under Title VII.
(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consider-
ation to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department
of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8(b), (c) (1978).
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other.64 Thus, as of 1972, the Wage and Hour Division permitted ei-
ther equal employer contributions or equal benefits to satisfy the Equal
Pay Act, while the EEOC demanded equal benefits regardless of the
equality or inequality of employer contributions. Then, in 1976, the
Supreme Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.65 In Gilbert,
female employees filed a Title VII sex discrimination charge against
their employer on the basis of the employer's practice of excluding
from its employee nonoccupational disability plan disabilities arising
from pregnancy. The Court decided the case in favor of the employer.
To reach this decision, the Court was forced to deal with contradictory
guidelines of the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division. The EEOC
guideline expressly stated that disabilities caused by pregnancy were to
be included as temporary disabilities under temporary disability
plans.66 On the other side was the "either-or" rule of the Wage and
Hour Division.67 The Supreme Court found, incident to its decision in
Gilbert, that the "either-or" rule of the Wage and Hour Division was
the correct interpretation of the law under Title VII.6s In so finding,
the Court disposed of the EEOC guideline by applying the thorough-
ness, validity and consistency tests of Skidmore v. Swift & CIo.69 The
Court found that the EEOC guideline was inconsistent with earlier pro-
nouncements of the agency and that when the EEOC issued the new
guideline, it did so without relying on any new source of legislative
history.7 °
Two years later, when presented with the Manhart case, the
Supreme Court took a dim view of the Wage and Hour Division's "ei-
ther-or" guideline7' that had been favorably viewed in Gilbert. The
64. The guideline provides:
(e) It shall not be a defense under title VIII [sic] to a charge of sex discrimination
in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.
(f) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension
or retirement plan. . . which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e), (f) (1978).
65. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
66. The guideline provides:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and
recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be
treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan
available in connection with employment. . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to disability
due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1978).
67. See note 61 su.pra.
68. 429 U.S. at 145.
69. 323 U.S. at 140. See note 59 supra.
70. 429 U.S. at 142, 145 (1976).
71. 435 U.S. at 714 n.26 (describing the "either-or" guideline, and reciting the reasons for
establishing such a guideline as perceived by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division).
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Court disavowed the "either-or" guideline in favor of another Wage
and Hour Division guideline that provided that a wage differential
based on differences in the average costs of employing men and women
violated the Equal Pay Act.72 As applied to the facts of Manhart, this
decision meant that the differential in take-home pay due to the differ-
ential in pension contributions based on the higher average cost of pen-
sion for female employees could not qualify for the "factor other than
sex" exception to the Equal Pay Act.
In rejecting the "either-or" guideline, the Court utilized the Skid-
more doctrine, the very doctrine that it had relied upon to uphold the
"either-or" rule in Gilbert. However, the Court was not required to
reject the "either-or" rule in order to approve of the "differential
wages-differential costs" guideline: the former covers only employer
contributions while the latter covers only employee contributions, and
only employee contributions were involved in Manhart. Given the fact
that the "either-or" rule expressly permits employer contributions to be
a function of sex if the benefits themselves are equal, the Court appar-
ently reasoned that the rule would permit employee contributions to
vary with sex if the benefits are equal. By so rejecting the "either-or"
guideline, the Supreme Court necessarily overruled the Gilbert case to
the extent that it depended on the Wage and Hour Division's adminis-
72. The guideline provides:
A wage differential based on claimed differences between the average cost of em-
ploying the employer's women workers as a group and the average cost of employing the
men workers as a group does not qualify as a differential based on any "factor other than
sex," and would result in a violation of the equal pay provisions, if the equal pay stan-
dard otherwise applies. To group employees solely on the basis of sex for purposes of
comparison of costs necessarily rests on the assumption that the sex factor alone may
justify the wage differential-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms and purposes
of the Equal Pay Act. Wage differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and
promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed, because in any grouping by
sex of the employees to which the cost data relates, the group cost experience is necessar-
ily assessed against an individual of one sex without regard to whether it costs an em-
ployer more or less to employ such individual than a particular individual of the
opposite sex under similar working conditions in jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.
29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1978).
The Court saw Manhart as presenting only a conflict between the two Wage and Hour Divi-
sion guidelines, whereas Gilbert posed a conflict between a Wage and Hour Division guideline
and an EEOC guideline. Arguably, the Court could have found a conflict between the guidelines
of the two agencies. The EEOC guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1978), says that an employer
cannot provide unequal benefits to male and female employees simply because it would cost it
more with respect to one sex than the other. See note 64 supra for the text of this section. The
Court could have read the EEOC guideline as implicitly forbidding an employer from passing on
the extra cost of pension benefits to the class of female employees because the guideline would
have no teeth without such an implicit prohibition. Operators of the outlawed unequal benefits
plans could comply with the guideline simply by providing for unequal contributions. Had the
Court been willing to so read the EEOC guideline, it could have had an additional conflict with
the "either-or" rule of the Wage and Hour Division.
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trative interpretation of the Equal Pay Act.73
Since Manhart was decided, the Wage and Hour Division has
promulgated proposed revisions to certain of its guidelines.74 Under
the proposed guidelines, the Division acquiesces in the Manhart deci-
sion and replaces the "either-or" rule with the rule that both employee
contributions and benefits must be equal. 75 Any differential in the cost
of employing the sexes must therefore be absorbed by the employer.
The conflicting EEOC and Wage and Hour Division guidelines prior to
Manhart led two commentators to conclude that "to speak of a 'settled'
administrative interpretation of the laws does not accord with real-
ity."' 76 Due to the Supreme Court's decision in Manhart and the result-
ing modifications in the Wage and Hour Division guidelines, however,
it now appears that a settled administrative interpretation of Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act is becoming a reality.
2. Legislative History of Title VII. One of the grounds for the
holding in Gilbert was that the effect of the Bennett Amendment was to
remove gender-based distinctions in the operation of pension plans
from the coverage of Title VII.7 7 The Court's basis for this conclusion
73. An interesting case for the purposes of the present discussion is EEOC v. Colby College,
439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977), rev'd, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978). The district court opinion
was handed down after the Supreme Court decided Gilbert but before it decided Manhart, al-
though Manhart had been lecided by the Ninth Circuit. In the Colby College case, both employer
and employee contributions were equal between the sexes, but females received smaller periodic
benefits than males (a defined benefit plan). The district court refused to find a violation of Title
VII relying on the Supreme Court's approval of the "either-or" guideline in Gilbert. The Colby
College court attempted to distinguish Manhart from Gilbert and the case before it on the grounds
that Manhart did not involve a conflict between an EEOC guideline and a Wage and Hour Divi-
sion guideline, while the other two cases did involve such a conflict; furthermore Gilbert required
the Wage and Hour Division guideline to prevail. Unsurprisingly, the First Circuit reversed the
trial court relying on the Supreme Court's disavowal of the "either-or" guideline. 589 F.2d 1139
(1st Cir. 1978).
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 800).
75. The proposed guideline provides:
(d) Employee benefts. Employee benefits are "wages" within the meaning of the
[Equal Pay A]ct. A differential in benefits based upon differences between the cost to the
employer of providing benefits to women as a group and the cost of providing benefits to
men as a group does not qualify as a differential based on a "factor other than sex"
within the meaning of section 6(d)(l)(iv) of the act. Such a differential therefore violates
the equal pay requirements of the act. Similarly, the act is violated if employees of one
sex are required to make greater contributions from their wages than are employees of
the opposite sex in order to receive equal benefits. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power
v. Manhart. . . . See also § 800.151 of this chapter.
43 Fed. Reg. 38,029, 38,031-32 (1978). The fact that this guideline requires equal employee con-
tributions supports the argument made in note 72 supra that the EEOC guidelines imply a re-
quirement of equal employee contributions.
76. Bernstein & Williams, supra note 33, at 1209.
77. 429 U.S. at 143-46. Gilbert was the first time the Supreme Court considered whether any
of the exceptions to Title VII excluded sex discrimination from coverage in pension plans. Al-
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was the Randolph-Humphrey exchange in the Senate during which
Senator Humphrey stated that differences in treatment of the sexes in
industrial benefit plans could continue under Title VII.78 The Court
commented: "[T]he quoted language of Senator Humphrey, the floor
manager of Title VII in the Senate,. . . support[s] what seems to us to
be the 'plain meaning' of the language used by Congress when it en-
acted § 703(a)(1) [of Title VII]."' 79 However, it should be noted that
Senator Humphrey's comment was offered as an interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment as it incorporated the Equal Pay Act. The Court
was wrong to use this piece of legislative history to interpret the basic
antidiscrimination provision of Title VII.
Two years after Gilbert, the Court in Manhart recognized that
Senator Humphrey's statement actually referred to the Equal Pay Act
and not to Title VII. ° It concluded that "Senator Humphrey's isolated
comment on the Senate floor cannot change the effect of the plain [anti-
discriminatory] language of the statute itself."'" Although the Court
did not expressly overrule Gilbert on this point, it cannot be doubted
that Manhart does in fact overrule the interpretation given to the legis-
lative history in Gilbert.2
though the district court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974), decided that
Title VII did prohibit differences in treatment of the sexes in pension plans, the Supreme Court
did not consider the question when the Fitzpatrick case came before it. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
78. MR. RANDOLPH: Mr. President, I wish to ask of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr.
Humphrey], who is the effective manager of the pending bill, a clarifying question on the
provisions of Title VII. I have in mind that the social security system, in certain respects,
treats men and women differently. For example, widow's benefits are paid automati-
cally; but a widower qualifies only if he is disabled or if he was actually supported by his
deceased wife. Also, the wife of a retired employee entitled to social security receives an
additional old age benefit: but the husband of such an employee does not. These differ-
ences in treatment as I recall, are of long standing.
Am I correct, I ask the Senator from Minnesota, in assuming that similar differences
of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including earlier retirement options for women,
may continue in operation under this bill, if it becomes law?
MR. HUMPHREY: Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier today by the
adoption of the Bennett amendment, so there can be no doubt about it.
110 CONG. REC. 13,663-64 (1964).
Apparently, Senator Humphrey believed that the Bennett Amendment contained an exemp-
tion from Title VII for gender-based distinctions in retirement plans, but no explicit language of
that provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), contains such an exception. For a discussion of why
the "factor other than sex" exception of the Equal Pay Act as incorporated into Title VII by the
Bennett Amendment is inapplicable, see notes 85 & 92 infra and text accompanying notes 83-92
infra.
79. 429 U.S. at 145.
80. 435 U.S. at 714.
81. Id.
82. Telephone interview with David J. Oliphant, Deputy City Attorney, City of Los Angeles,
California (Oct. 10, 1978) (Mr. Oliphant represented the Department in Manhart at the appellate
level).
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3. Longevity as a "Factor Other Than Sex." The third reason the
Supreme Court in Gilbert allowed the employer to exclude from a disa-
bility plan the costs incurred due to pregnancy was that pregnancy is a
factor other than sex that renders any wage or benefits differential non-
discriminatory.83 The reasoning underlying this holding was that Title
VII, which incorporates the Equal Pay Act by virtue of the Bennett
Amendment, permits a wage differential between the sexes "where such
payment is made pursuant to . . .a differential based on any other
factor other than sex."'84 The Court pointed out in Gilbert that the dis-
tinction was not drawn along sexual lines, for the class of nonpregnant
persons includes women as well as men. Pregnancy, thus, is a physical
condition, not a gender-based trait, and its costs could be lawfully ex-
cluded from a disability plan, absent a showing of actual discrimina-
tory intent.8 5
In Manhart, the Department argued that the contributions differ-
83. 429 U.S. at 133-40.
84. Id. at 143 n.21.
85. The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list
of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification. . . .Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one
sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect
to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides
potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.
429 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)). Geduldig was a
challenge factually similar to Gilbert, but based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment as opposed to Title VII.
The Court in Gilbert did not expressly incorporate the "factor other than sex" rule of the
Equal Pay Act into its reasoning, but it is clear by implication from the quote above that the Court
viewed pregnancy as a physical condition, and thus a factor other than sex. The Court did not
bring the Equal Pay Act into its analysis because there was no wage differential resulting from the
exclusion of benefits due to pregnancy, 429 U.S. at 137-40, such differential being required to
invoke the Equal Pay Act. In making this finding, the Court looked at the benefits received by
female employees and male employees, and concluded that "there is no proof that the package is
in fact worth more to men than to women." Id. at 138. Thus, in the words of the Court, it
measured benefits to women and men not on the basis of individual employees, but on the basis of
"the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program." Id. (quoting the
Court in Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496). Compare this measurement scheme with the standard set by
the Court two years later in Manhart: "IT]he basic policy of the statute [Title VII] requires that we
focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." 435 U.S. at 709. Thus, in Gilbert,
the Court utilized actuarial data on the group experiences of men and women which it had held to
be impermissible in Aanhart. In Gilbert, the Court should have accepted, for the sake of argu-
ment, that a differential on an individual basis existed, and then applied the Equal Pay Act to find
that pregnancy was a "factor other than sex" that precluded a finding of discrimination.
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ential was based on longevity, a "factor other than sex."86 The
Supreme Court directly answered this argument in the Manhart opin-
ion:
It is plain... that any individual's life expectancy is based on a
number of factors, of which sex is only one. The record contains no
evidence that any factor other than the employee's sex was taken into
account in calculating the 14.84% differential between the respective
contributions by men and women. We agree with Judge Duniway's
observation [in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Manhart] that one can-
not "say that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is 'based
on an7y other factor other than sex.' Sex is exactly what it is basedon. , 8
The Court went on to say that "[o]n its face, this plan [Manhart] dis-
criminates on the basis of sex whereas the General Electric plan dis-
criminated on the basis of a special physical disability."8" Thus,
pregnancy is a "factor other than sex," but longevity, when based en-
tirely on sex, is not. The key to distinguishing Gilbert and Manhart on
this point is that the class of nonpregnant persons in Gilbert is com-
posed of members of both sexes while the group attributed with greater
longevity in Manhart is exclusively female, and therefore subject to the
coverage of Title V1I. 89 Although Manhart implicitly overruled the Gil-
bert holding as to administrative guidelines9" and legislative history,9'
it left untouched the determination of Gilbert that pregnancy is a "fac-
tor other than sex."9
86. Opening Brief for Petitioner, 46-49; Reply Brief for Petitioner, 14-16.
87. 435 U.S. at 712-13 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 715.
89. Id.
90. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
92. The Court in Manhart did not expressly overrule Gilbert or any part thereof. In a sepa-
rate opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for this. Blackmun, however, did not
concern himself with the administrative interpretations and legislative history prongs. He would
have overruled Gilbert in its entirety due to the third prong:
The Court's distinction between the present case and General Electric-that the per-
mitted classes there were "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons," both female and
male, .. seems to me to be just too easy. It is probably the only distinction that can be
drawn. For me, it does not serve to distinguish the case on any principled basis. I there-
fore must conclude that today's decision cuts back on GeneralElectric, and inferentially
on Geduldig, the reasoning of which was adopted there ... and, indeed makes the
recognition of those cases as continuing precedent somewhat questionable. I do not say
that is necessarily bad. If that is what Congress has chosen to do by Title VII---as the
Court today with such assurance asserts-so be it. I feel, however, that we should meet
the posture of the earlier cases head on and not by their rationalization that seeks to
distinguish but fails in its quest.
435 U.S. at 725.
While the Supreme Court allowed Gilbert to survive on its third prong, the Congress dealt
Gilbert its death blow. After Manhart, an amendment to Title VII was enacted denying preg-
nancy the status of a "factor other than sex." The statute provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
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4. Does the Equal Employee Contributions-Equal Benefits Rule
of Manhart Discriminate Against Men? In Manhart, the Department
argued that if the group of female employees both contributed to the
pension fund and received periodic benefits on a basis equal to that of a
group of male employees, then the group of female employees would
not be paying for its fair share of the annuity plan because of the fe-
male group's greater average longevity. The Department contended
that in an equal contributions-equal benefits program, a woman will
receive the monthly benefit check for a longer period than a male,
thereby receiving total benefits in excess of the male's, without having
paid more into the fund for this offsetting advantage. According to this
argument, fairness to the group of male employees requires that em-
ployers utilize sex-segregated actuarial tables leading to either unequal
contributions or unequal periodic benefits.93
The Court responded that all insurance involves subsidies. Insur-
ance being a risk-spreading device, the risks that fall below the average
of the insured group always subsidize the risks that exceed the average
risk of the group. The Court held:
[W]hen insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsidize
the poorer risks. Healthy persons subsidize medical benefits for the
less healthy; unmarried workers subsidize the pensions of married
workers; persons who eat, drink, or smoke to excess may subsidize
pension benefits for persons whose habits are more temperate. Treat-
ing different classes of risks as though they were the same for pur-
poses of group insurance is a common practice which has never been
considered inherently unfair. To insure the flabby and the fit as
though they were equivalent risks may be more common than treat-
ing men and women alike; but nothing more than habit makes one
"subsidy" seem less fair than the other.94
In this one paragraph in Manhart, the Supreme Court summarized
an argument deserving of much lengthier treatment. The argument be-
gins with the proposition that all types of insurance, including pen-
sions, require that predictions about the risks of the group to be insured
be made with a statistically valid basis. In order for such predictions to
lead to a financially sound insurance program, the insured group must
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title [the Bennett Amendment] shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise.
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k). Due to the new statute
the EEOC has promulgated guidelines on sex discrimination and pregnancy. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,805
(1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10).
93. Opening Brief for Petitioner, 23-26; Reply Brief for Petitioner, 16-19.
94. 435 U.S. at 710 (footnotes omitted).
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be of substantial size.95 One basis for statistically valid predictions is
that, as a group, women live longer than men.96 If it could be proven
that every woman will in fact outlive every man, the Title VII sex dis-
crimination charge would not be made out. But that is not the case. In
fact, the standard deviation97 from the average life expectancy is quite
high for both males and females.98 While the actuarial tables indicate
that the average sixty-five year-old man will die at age eighty-two and
the average sixty-five year-old woman will die at age eighty-six, 99 indi-
vidual statistics will show that eighty-four percent of the females will
actually die at the same age as their male counterparts. t 0 The greater
average life expectancy of females may be accounted for by the sixteen
percent of the women and the sixteen percent of the men whose death
ages do not match. Thus, "the effect of the actuarial grouping by sex is
to compel an intra-group subsidy among women: all women are com-
pelled to contribute more to a retirement fund than any man is re-
quired to contribute because some women will live longer than most
women and most men." '' Classification by sex places a significant
number of people into the wrong risk grouping, and is therefore unfair
to those individuals. 02 Title VII demands fairness to individuals and
will not tolerate the attribution to individuals of a group an average
that has so high a standard deviation that in the majority of cases, there
95. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 34 supra. All available evidence indicates that at least part of this difference
may be explained by genetic factors, but that it is also due to a number of environmental factors,
such as smoking and drinking levels, the amount of stress to which one is subjected, driving hab-
its, and personality traits. D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 316 (3d ed. 1975);
Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classjfication, FORUM 1205, 1220
(1975).
97. Standard deviation is a measure of the tendency of the individual members of the group
to differ from the average for the group. C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND
ECONoMics 397 (1977).
98. Bernstein & Williams, supra note 33, at 1221-22.
99. See note 34 supra.
100. Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 n.5 (1975); King, supra note 32, at 556-57
(quoting Professor Barbara Bergmann of Committee W of the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors).
101. Van Alstyne, supra note 50, at 151.
102. The Court recognized this in a footnote in Manhart:
The Department's . . . contribution schedule distinguished only imperfectly between
long-lived and short-lived employees, while distinguishing precisely between male and
female employees. In contrast, an entirely gender-neutral system of contributions and
benefits would result in differing retirement benefits precisely "based on" longevity, for
retirees with long lives would always receive more money than comparable employees
with short lives. Such a plan would also distinguish in a crude way between male and
female pensioners, because of the difference in their average life spans. It is this sort of
disparity-and not an explicitly gender-based differential-that the Equal Pay Act in-
tended to authorize [under its exemption for "factors other than sex"].
435 U.S. at 713 n.24.
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will be no actual difference between the individual members of the var-
ious groups. 0 3 Indeed, it is not at all clear that Title VII will permit
such attribution to individuals of group characteristics absent a show-
ing that 100% of the members of the group possess the characteristic to
be attributed to them. The solution demanded by Title VII is the elimi-
nation of classification by sex, and the use of classification by age
alone"° in allocating the costs of pensions. The mandate of Manhart-
sex-neutral pension plans-does not require an abandonment of the
risk-spreading principles of insurance; it only necessitates an abandon-
ment of the traditional sex-segregated actuarial tables. To accomplish
this, the insurer must rely on large groupings of insureds. The larger
the group, the more the risk is spread. 0 Thus, because grouping by
sex reduces the size of the insured group, such grouping actually vio-
lates the principles of insurance as well as the requirements of Title
VII. 106
Thus, Manhart and the principles of insurance require that the
costs of pension plans be allocated over the female group of employees
and the male group of employees on an equal basis. This allocation
will result in a greater cost of a pension for males, but this increased
cost does not mean that males are "subsidizing" females. It only means
that the risk of longevity is being spread over the insured group in a
manner as fair to each individual as possible where insurers and pen-
sion plans must necessarily rely on group characteristics. If the cost of
103. "If it is unjust for men to pay for the longevity of women, it is equally unjust for the 84
percent of women who die at the same time as their male counterparts to pay for the extra longev-
ity of the remaining 16 percent." Gold 626.
104. Classification and grouping by age in employment situations is generally prohibited. 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976). However, an exemption to this prohibition exists when the employer is
observing the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan including pension plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(o (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
One could ask, however, why similar arguments are not made against age classification.
A man who retires at age sixty, with a given dollar accumulation, will ordinarily receive
a smaller [periodic] pension benefit than a man who retires at age seventy. If one cannot
consider the greater life expectancy of the average sixty-five year old woman as com-
pared to the average sixty-five year old man, can periodic benefits be based upon the
greater life expectancy of the average sixty-year old man as compared to the average
seventy-year old man? Certainly, some retirees at age sixty will have fewer post-retire-
ment years than seventy-year old retirees....
Similarly, higher automobile insurance premiums for drivers under twenty-five is
[sic] not fair to the many careful young drivers. We accept these age classifications, even
if they are in some degree inequitable, because either each individual suffers the burden
at some point [as in the case of automobile insurance] or [in the case of early retirement]
the individual chooses whether to subject himself to harsher conditions.
Halperin & Gross 249-50 (footnote omitted).
105. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
106. The reason insurers have traditionally violated the principle of large groupings by differ-
entiating on the basis of sex was to lower the cost of pensions for men who comprise a larger
segment of the pension market than do women. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
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a pension is now greater for a male, it is not due to any unfairness to
the male, but only to the fact that the male had been paying less than
his fair share previously. 7
III. AFTER Manhart
A. The Necessity of Equal Benefits.
The Manhart case involved a differential in the levels of employee
contributions to a pension fund. The Court held that a defined benefit
plan cannot so differentiate on the basis of sex. If Manhart is to end sex
discrimination in employer-operated pension plans, then this holding
must also prohibit defined contribution plans from paying smaller peri-
odic benefits to women. If equal periodic benefits were not required,
employers now operating defined benefit plans would switch over to
defined contribution plans. Both unequal contributions in a defined,
benefit plan and unequal benefits in a defined contribution plan result
from the use of the differing average life expectancies of the two
sexes' 0 8 which the Court found to be discriminatory in Manhart. If the
use of such data is prohibited in determining contributions, it must also
be prohibited in determining benefits." 9
Aside from the implied reasoning of Manhart, other courts and
agencies have required equal benefits for the sexes in pension plans." 0
In addition, the two main administrative interpreters in the area of sex
discrimination, the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division of the De-
partment of Labor, have issued guidelines or proposed guidelines that
require equal benefits."'
B. Methods of Compliance with Manhart.
In complying with the Manhart rule of equal employee contribu-
107. "The advantages males now enjoy rest on an unlawful system. In short, were uni-sex
actuarial tables used, males would fare no worse than they would have had the retirement system
been operated in a fair lawful manner all along." EEOC, Unequal Benefits Resulting From Sex-
SegregatedActuarial TablesAre Sex Biased, 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6431, at 4153 (1974);
accord, United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
108. See notes 34-35"supra and accompanying text.
109. In Manhart, the Court did not specifically discuss equal benefits. The one indication,
other than the logic of the matter itself, that the Court a priori considered equal benefits to be
required by Title VII is in a footnote referring to "an entirely gender-neutral system of contribu-
tions and benefits. ... 435 U.S. at 713 n.24 (emphasis added).
110. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978) (based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Manhar); Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore. 1975) (citing favorably the
district court opinion in Manhart); EEOC, supra note 107, at 4153.
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(0 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029, 32,031-32 (1978) (proposed amendment
to 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d)). The Wage and Hour Division guideline cites Manhart as its authority.
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tions and equal benefits in pension plans, plan operators must necessar-
ily be concerned with maintaining the financial soundness of the
plan. 2 Assuming the continued use of sex-segregated life expectancy
tables, it still costs more to provide a pension to women as a group
because of their greater average longevity. This cost must be allocated
over the entire class of employees either directly or indirectly.1 3 At
least four methods of compliance with Manhart have been proposed
that should help assure the financial soundness of pension plans.
1. Class fcation by a Combination of Traits. Some commenta-
tors," 4 recognizing that the greater average longevity of females is due
partly to genetic factors and partly to environmental factors," 5 have
suggested that it may be permissible to use sex as a factor in determin-
ing pension costs and benefits if this were limited to the extent that the
difference in longevity was due to genetic factors. To accomplish this,
individuals must also be actuarially classified according to the environ-
mental factors, including smoking and drinking habits, weight
problems, driving habits, and personality traits. 1 6 Although such a
concept was not specifically sanctioned in Manhart, the Court did fac-
tually distinguish, without comment as to consequences, the case before
it from a hypothetical one where sex plus a number of other factors
were used to determine an individual's longevity." 7 If indeed a sex-
linked genetic element in longevity could be isolated, the Supreme
Court might permit a plan to differentiate between the sexes-genetics
being a "factor other than sex" for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act
exemption."18 Any plan must also be based on proof that all women
possess the genetic trait, so that there is little chance of a woman being
classified in the wrong group. However, at the present time, medical
science is unable to accurately isolate a sex-linked genetic factor in lon-
gevity or to show that such a factor is possessed by all women. There-
fore, this alternative is not currently feasible. 1 9
112. Although the court in Colby College followed the Supreme Court's holding in Manhart, it
was skeptical whether the financial soundness of pension plans could be achieved under Manhart.
589 F.2d at 1144-46.
113. Gold 623.
114. Halperin & Gross 249.
115. See note 96 supra.
116. All nongenetic factors responsible for the greater longevity of women must be isolated in
order to determine the genetic factor involved.
117. 435 U.S. at 712.
118. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text. Of course, even if the Supreme Court
were to sanction genetics as a "factor other than sex," the Congress could statutorily override the
Court, as it did with pregnancy. See note 92 supra.
119. Even if the "genetic factor" could be isolated, the multiple traits theory is unlikely to be
utilized. First, the administrative costs of annuities would rise, for the means of measuring multi-
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2. Employer-added Contributions. The above idea of predicting
longevity based on age, sex and several other traits envisions a change
in the actuarial methods of the pension operator. It is possible, how-
ever, to continue to operate a pension fund utilizing sex-segregated ac-
tuarial tables to predict the cost of the pension plan. It is clear that
these tables will continue to reflect the greater average longevity of
women and they will continue to demand higher contributions for a
woman than for a man in order that equal benefits may be paid without
depleting the fund.120 Since these added contributions cannot be as-
sessed to the class of women employees, the added contributions must
come from the employer. 2' Indeed, this is how the Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power has complied with Title VII. 22
Employer-added contributions effectively spread the cost of the
greater average longevity of female employees over the entire class of
employees. By having the employer make increased contributions for
the female employees, the employer has less money to devote to the
payment of present wages that could be spread over all employees. 2 3
The one problem with the theory of employer-added contributions
is that it provides a disincentive for the employer to hire women be-
cause it will cost him more in total compensation amounts to employ
women than to employ men. If this disincentive actually induces an
employer to hire employees with his eye on the gender composition of
his workforce, he will violate Title VII.124 Of course, this discrimina-
tion would be subtle and therefore difficult to prove in a court of law.
Because of the disincentive to hire women, employer-added contribu-
tions are not the most effective way to end sex-discriminatory plans.
This funding method removes an overt form of discrimination yet en-
courages employers to engage in discrimination of a more subtle na-
ture.125
ple traits would be costly. Investigation of the personal habits of each annuitant cannot help but
cost more than a cursory check of gender. Indeed, the multiple traits must be constantly tabulated
because the personal habits of people, unlike their sex, may change. Second, the multiple traits
theory would defeat the insurance principle of spreading risk over large groups. (See notes 30-33
supra and the accompanying text.) It would result in a number of small groups instead of a few
groupings by age. Finally, by utilizing so many groups, the risk of placing someone in the wrong
groups would be multiplied many times over.
120. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
121. Title VII is concerned only with the amount of employee contributions and benefits. The
guidelines interpreting the statute make this clear. See notes 64, 72 & 75 supra.
122. See note 47 supra.
123. Gold 622-23.
124. See note 3 supra.
125. Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's
Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1978); Bernstein & Williams, supra note 33, at 1212; Note,
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3. Unisex Actuarial Tables. Another method of equalizing em-
ployee contributions and benefits entails an alteration in the actuarial
methods used for the pension. This method is based upon unisex actu-
arial tables. These tables merge the sex-segregated tables presently in
use and yield an average life expectancy of a person, male or female.
The average life expectancy of people derived from such a table will be
somewhat above the life expectancy derived from the male table and
somewhat below the life expectancy derived from the female table. Be-
cause the average life expectancy of a male will be greater when deter-
mined by reference to a unisex table rather than a sex-segregated table,
the cost of a pension to a male will increase, as reflected by higher
contributions or lower periodic benefits. Similarly, the cost of a pen-
sion to a woman will decrease. This is because the risk disparity 26 of
the unisex group is greater than for either the male group or the female
group; therefore, the average risk for the unisex group gravitates to a
point between the average risk for the two sex-segregated groups. Al-
though the risk disparity would be greater under a unisex system, the
unfairness of being placed in the wrong group would be eliminated, 27
and that is the point of Title VII.
The one hidden issue here is that in using unisex tables, account
must be made of the male-female ratio in the employer's workforce, for
the higher the proportion of women in the workforce, the higher the
average life expectancy of the whole workforce will be, 28 and thus the
total cost of the pension plan. Unisex tables, nonetheless, will accom-
plish Title VII's requirement of spreading the total cost of the plan over
the entire class of employees undifferentiated by sex. The male-female
ratio would only be involved in measuring the total cost of the pension
plan, 129 but not in spreading it, an idea that was fully envisioned by the
Court in Manhart. 30 However, such a system creates a disincentive for
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civii Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109,
1175 (1971).
126. Risk disparity is a measure of the difference between the greatest risk of the group and
the least risk of the group.
127. Halperin & Gross 249.
128. The idea of a mandated unisex annuity table has been advanced, under which label
the assumption is usually made that the same annuity table would apply to different
annuitant groups regardless of the proportion of males and females in them. This would
not be the result; a law based on such an assumption would be analogous to well-mean-
ing legislation attempting to transform rr into a whole number. Benefit cost calculations
would still have to take into account differences in life spans represented by the propor-
tion of males and females in covered groups in order to fund incurred liabilities.
King, supra note 32, at 560. The First Circuit Court of Appeals echoed this criticism of unisex
tables. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978).
129. Gold 627. But see Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination, supra note 125 (arguing
that unisex tables can be used to measure as well as to spread the cost of pension plans).
130. 435 U.S. at 718.
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employers who contribute to pension funds to hire women, just as does
the system of employer-added contributions,' 3' since total compensa-
tion costs will decrease with the number of women in the workforce.
As a matter of policy, such an incentive to discriminate against women
should not exist.
Employers adopting unisex tables must use caution in setting em-
ployee contribution and benefit levels. The Equal Pay Act prohibits
equalization of wages by reducing the wage rate of any employee.'
32
Raising contributions of males or lowering benefits to males may con-
stitute a reduction in the wage rate of males. If so, employer-added
contributions would seem to be the only method of compliance with
Manhart that utilizes an employer-operated pension plan. Of course,
Title VII does not have a provision similar to that of the Equal Pay Act
and the courts have not read one into the statute.' 33 Therefore, the
acceptable means of remedying unequal treatment of the sexes in pen-
sion plans depends to some extent on how the violation is character-
ized.
4. Cash Lump Sum Payments to Employees. The Court in Man-
hart said:
Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an
employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each em-
ployee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or
her accumulated contributions could command in the open mar-
ket. 134
The amassed contributions for each similarly situated employee will be
the same regardless of sex due to the mandate of Title VII. But, as long
as private insurers use sex-segregated actuarial tables, a woman with
the same amount of amassed contributions as a man will not be able to
purchase an annuity with periodic benefits as great as her male coun-
terpart, for Title VII applies only to employers, not to private insurers.
The private insurer is therefore free to engage in price discrimination
between men and women.' 35 Since this type of system would totally
131. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
133. See note 107 supra.
134. 435 U.S. at 717-18.
135. But the Court pointed out in a footnote in Manhart that it did not mean to suggest that
"an employer can avoid its responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate
shells. Title VII applies to 'any agent' of a covered employer." 435 U.S. at 718 n.33. Besides the
agency theory, some commentators would prevent private insurers from discriminating against
women regardless of any relationship between the employer and the insurer by using the state
action doctrine; the argument being that the state regulatory bodies that oversee insurance compa-
nies cannot permit sex discrimination. Halperin & Gross at 240; Note, Gender Classpfcation in the
Insurance Industry, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 1381, 1394-96 (1975).
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eliminate all employer-based discrimination, cash lump sum payments
are the best way to comply with the letter of Title VII. However, the
spirit of Title VII would not be vindicated, for sex discrimination in
annuities would continue, albeit without employer involvement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII requires that employers deal with employees on the basis
of their individual attributes and not the "average traits" of their sex.
Insurance principles require grouping by traits with the classification of
individuals within any group according to the "average traits" of the
group. Traditionally, insurers have grouped people by sex. In the area
of pension plans this has meant that pensions cost more for women
than for men due to the greater average longevity of women. In Man-
hart, the Supreme Court held that Title VII demands that employer-
operated pension plats not charge women more for a pension than
men. Of the four proposed methods of compliance with Manhart, none
is well-suited to the goal of eliminating sex discrimination. Classifica-
tion by a combination of traits is presently impossible due to the lack of
medical evidence, and the legality of such a method is by no means
clearly established. Both employer-added contributions and unisex ac-
tuarial tables provide an incentive for employers to discriminate
against women in hiring, as opposed to the discrimination in compen-
sation found in Manhart. Furthermore, unisex tables may be violative
of the Equal Pay Act. Cash lump sum payments of contributions to
employees effectively eliminate employer sex discrimination, but leave
women subject to discrimination by private insurers not reached by Ti-
tle VII. Clearly, Manhart has not resolved all the problems of sex dis-
crimination in pension plans. Perhaps the problem is not so much with
the civil rights laws as with actuarial principles. 1 36 Thus, the Supreme
Court has given the insurance industry a mandate to measure insur-
ance costs in a statistically valid way that does not discriminate in any
manner on the basis of sex.
Gordon A Kanofsky
136. Indeed, the First Circuit in EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1144 (1st Cir. 1978),
expressed doubts whether Manhart could be implemented without revolutionizing the insurance
industry.
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